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1.2 Abbreviations and Terms 
English French Comorian 
AU/OAU: African Union/ 
Organization of African Unity 
UN: United Nations 
UNGA: United Nations 
General Assembly 
UNSC: United Nations 
Security Council 
LAS/AL: League of Arab 
States/ Arab League 
 
Tournante: Rotating 
presidency established by 2001 
Constitution  
CENI: Conseil Electorale 
Nationale Independante  
CTOM: Collectivite Territoire 
d’Outre Mer 
TOM: Territoire d’Outre Mer 
DOM: Départements d'outre-
mer  
OIF: Organisation 
Internationale de la 
Fracophonie  
ICO: Indian Ocean 
Commission/ Commission 
l'Océan  Indien (COI) 
DGSE: Directorate-General 
for External Security, French 
intelligence agency 
 
Ngazidja: Grande Comore 
Ndzwani: Anjoaun 
Mwali: Moheli 
Maore: Mayotte 
Wakabaila: nobles/aristocracy 
of Arab descent 
Wamatsaha: peasants, farmers, 
lower classes predominantly of 
Malagasy or Bantu descent 
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1.3 Abstract 
Since its independence in 1975 the Union of Comoros has seen a great deal of political upheaval as a 
part of its decolonization process. This study examines the period between 1975 and 2001 with 
special emphasis on the 1997 Secession Crisis and the methods by which that crisis was resolved. 
The literature review is composed of predominantly native Comorian authors, supplemented by 
several French authors and information from international organizations. The events and literature 
are also examined through the lenses of the psychoanalytical group identity theory of Vamik Volkan 
and the Conflict Transformation work of Johan Galtung. Data regarding attitudes and general 
knowledge of this period in Comorian history was obtained through a qualitative study conducted 
with forty participants from across Comoros. The findings suggested that the majority of responses 
from the island of Anjoaun showed a greater knowledge and personal connection to the events of 
1997, while many Grande Comoriens were either not aware of or had forgotten about the crisis. The 
findings also indicated that Anjoaunese participants were more likely to believe there was a tension 
or conflict between the islands than their Grande Comorien counterparts. The literature review 
findings indicated that Comoros is in a period of relative political stability and has begun the 
establishing political norms regarding free and fair elections which can be directly attributed to the 
2001 Constitution.  
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1.4 Introduction 
 The latter half of the twentieth century saw many former colonial territories of European 
powers gain independence, many through bloodshed. The Comorian Archipelago’s bloodless 1974 
referendum marked it apart from the conflicts seen by other former French territories but that did 
not guarantee an easy transition into sovereignty. The Comorian state has weathered almost two 
dozen coup d’etats, some led by internal actors and others by a core group of mercenaries. The 
urban/rural divides, typified by subtle ethnic distinctions and historical class roles have split 
elements of Comorian society against each other for decades. The international community has 
intervened multiple times to ensure the appropriate transition of power and to offer meditative 
solutions to the political tensions between the islands.  
 This research project will first present a timeline of the general events and actors involved in 
the first twenty years of Comorian independence. By using a literature composed of predominantly 
Comorian authors and their often-disparate views on the importance of different events the author 
has blended them in with a smaller selection of reports published through the African Union, the 
United Nations, and several academic articles detailing the time period. After the literature review to 
establish a timeline and context for a relatively unknown case study the project will use those works 
to supplement the quantitative analysis obtained through the authors interviews and then the totality 
of the work will be analyzed through the lens of Vamik Volkan’s Large Group Identity Theory and 
Johann Galtung’s 3R’s. Volkan’s work will be used to analyze some of the psychological and cultural 
markers between the islands and some of the potential causes for disparity in the responses to the 
survey questions. Galtung’s work has been useful in evaluating the different stages of how the 2001 
constitution was written. Furthermore, this study has compared the texts of the five distinct 
Comorian constitutions and constitutional charters. In analyzing those texts against the established 
timeline light can be shed on some of the historic tensions between islands and autonomous groups. 
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  The interviews associated with this study have been used to collect a small sample 
population of attitudes towards the actions of France in the Comorian decolonization process. Due 
to the ages of most candidates the questions focused less on the events immediately after 
independence but rather on the opinions and a priori knowledge regarding the new constitution.  
1.5 Geographic Information 
                                      (CIA World Factbook) 
 Located in the Mozambique Channel between the Tanzanian coast and northern Madagascar 
the Comorian archipelago has been influenced by  Bantu settlers from the African continent, Arab 
traders and missionaries, Malagasy pirates, and finally English and French colonizers (Chami-Allaoui 
et al, 1997) Approximately the same size as the American state of Rhode Island, the archipelago 
most notable for its coral reefs surrounding the island of Moheli and Karthala, the largest active 
volcano in the world, located in the center of Grande Comore.  
The islands only deep-water port is found in Anjoaunese capital of Mutsamudu where 
imported goods are rerouted to Grande Comore on smaller ships. Said Sheikh Mohammed Airport 
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in Hahaya, Grande Comore, is the only international airport in the country; however occasionally 
regional companies like AB Aviation will offer special flights from Anjouan to Mahajanga, 
Madagascar.   
Section 2: Literature Review 
2.1 The Colonial Period and 1974 Referendum 
 It is unclear exactly when the Comorian archipelago was settled and by who. The 
archaeological record seems to show that each island was settled at different times by different 
groups (Chami-Allaoui, 1997.) Arab traders knew of the islands, dubbing Mayotte “Jizr al-Mowt,” 
Arabic for the “Island of Death” for its treacherous reefs. Some time in the seventh or eighth 
centuries missionaries introduced Islam and gradually established small sultanates among the islands 
(Chanfi Ahmed, 1994). The island of Mayotte was the first of the four to be formally colonized in 
1841 when France purchased the territory from a local king (Hassani el Barwane, 2015). Over the 
following decades the remaining three islands were colonized and the entire archipelago was 
incorporated as a French territory in the province of Madagascar in 1912 (ibid.) Comorians fought 
for France in both world wars and many of those veterans moved to the metropoles. Current 
estimates place roughly 200,000 Comorians in France, many descended from the “tirailleurs” 
(sharpshooters) who moved to Marseille after their service (Halifa, 2009).  This population base in 
France has proven hugely influential to contemporary Comorian politics, especially in the era 
immediately following Comoros’ unilateral declaration of independence in 1975.  
 Although the archipelago had been granted autonomous rule in the 1950’s the independence 
movement built up steam throughout the entirety of the autonomous period. Prominent figures like 
Prince Said Mohammed Cheikh and future President Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane pushed the 
French government for a definitive timeline on ending French rule, eventually agreeing in 1973 that 
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Comoros would gain independence in 1976. However, the deaths of both Said Mohammed Cheikh 
and Georges Pompidou in the early 1970’s led to the derailment of the process. On December 22nd, 
1974 a referendum on independence was held across the four Comorian islands. The clear majority 
of voters chose to leave French rule, but of the 12,390 recorded votes on Mayotte 8,091 chose not 
to leave France (Mattoir, 2004).  It is the results of that initial vote that resonates with Comorians to 
this day. However the various political and cultural reasons surrounding Mayotte’s decision to 
remain with France is outside the scope of this research.  
 Although the Comorian archipelago was administered as an autonomous entity consisting of 
four islands the French government decided to interpret the results of the vote island by island- thus 
nullifying the overall results and keeping Mayotte as a CTOM. This division of territory has a shaky 
legal foundation. Article 53 of the French constitution states “No ceding, exchanging or acquiring of 
territory shall be valid without the consent of the population concerned.” (Constitute Project) This 
clause was used to argue that Mayotte voted independently and thus would be judged independently. 
This goes against statements made by high-ranking French officials like Olivier Stern, French 
secretaire d’etat a l’Outre Mer, from 1974 to 1978. When asked about the territorial integrity of 
Comoros Stirn responded 
 “… because in the terms of international law, a territory retains the same frontiers it had as a colony… and finally 
it is not the role of France to foster in Comoros people one against the other; on the contrary [France’s] role is to 
facilitate coming together between the two to find an appropriate legal solution.” (Mattoir, 2004) 
Factors specific to intra-Comorian relations as well as French objectives led the majority of 
Mahorais to vote the way they did. A more detailed analysis of those influences will be discussed in 
section 4 through the lens of Vamik Volkan’s work on group identity theory.  
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2.2 Ali Soilihi’s Revolution 
The aftermath of the initial referendum in 1974 led Comoros to unilaterally declare independence 
from France on July 6th, 1975. French officials were expelled from Comoros while the security of 
Mayotte was placed under heavy scrutiny. Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, one of the chief architects 
of the vote, was elected President of the young federation. Within a month of Abdallah taking the 
mantle of the presidency, he was usurped by Prince Said Mohammed Djaffar and exiled to France 
(Mattoir, 2004.) Djaffar’s claim wouldn’t last long as he was quickly deposed by his Minster of 
Defense, Ali Soilihi.  
 While Abdallah and Djaffar did not hold office long enough to pursue any sort of agenda or 
establish a doctrine Ali Soilihi moved to hastily cement himself in the presidential palace, Beit-Salam. 
Envisioning a Marxist revolution Soilihi passed a new constitution reflecting his own brand of 
socialism, without seeking support, ideological or otherwise, from the Soviet Union or China (Said 
Abdillah, 2011). Soilihi’s constitution was unique amongst the various iterations in Comorian 
history. The voting age was lowered to fifteen and the role of Islam was greatly diminished within 
the government (Digitheque-MJP, 2012). Soilihi attempted to entrench his power with the youth, 
the largest demographic group, promising to stimulate development projects and increase gender 
and social equality. Of the sixteen members of the National Popular Committee, all were in their last 
year of secondary school (Mattoir, 2004).  
One of Soilihi’s most difficult undertakings was trying to eliminate the Anda or “Grande 
Marriage” ceremony. As mentioned n the authors earlier writings on Comoros, the Anda is a dearly 
held but extremely controversial subject within Comoros where the wealthiest members of society 
on Grande Comore will spend tens of thousands of euros on an elaborate marriage ceremony. 
Current estimates (2016) put the average cost between 20,000-100,000 euros. This was yet another 
13 
 
iteration of the conflict between the wakabaila and wamatsaha. The wealthy Moroni elite, as well as 
the significant Comorian population in Marseille, conspired with Bob Denard to remove Soilihi 
from office (Halifa, 2009). Soilihi’s pseudo-socialism jeopardized the financial dominance of the 
elites and their way of life, and as such, this period saw the exodus of many wealthy Comorians to 
France and Madagascar. 
 While many of Soilihi’s policies were ill advised and hastily implemented he has been cast in 
an extremely negative light in contemporary Comorian literature. His willingness to move away from 
the deeply rooted Islamic heritage of the islands was viewed as a betrayal to the islands culture. Even 
the Comorian flag of the Soilihi period attempted to subvert the influence of Islam. The red bar 
representing the revolution was made larger and placed above the green bar that past and future 
flags used to represent Comoros’ attachment to the color of the prophet (Halifa, 2009). The 
common thread throughout all the available literature is that Soilihi betrayed something essential to 
the Comorian identity. In the terms Vamik Volkan’s Group Identity Theory, Soilihi insulted the 
shared reservoirs of images and traditions that many Comorians consider integral to their identity as 
not only Muslims, but the specific traditions of Comorian Chaifite Islam.     
 Landing on Itsandra beach with a small but highly trained force in the middle of the night on 
May 12th 1978, Bob Denard once again seized control of Comoros. This time however he was in for 
the long haul. Changing his name to Said Mustapha, converting to Islam, and marrying a Comorian 
woman, Denard set out to disguise his de facto power within the Comorian government (Mattoir, 
2004). Ahmed Abdallah went through the streets of Moroni with his accomplices proclaiming “Vive 
l’amitie franco-comorienne” and “Vive l’Islam!” (Mattoir, 2004). Within two weeks Ali Soilihi had 
been caught, allegedly assassinated by order of the newly restored council of ministers. Ahmed 
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Abdallah reclaimed the title of president and named Bob Denard as commander of the 500 strong 
Presidential Guard.  
2.3 The Mercenary Regime 
 Abdallah’s new regime immediately nullified Soilihi’s constitution in a dramatic reversal. 
Islam was again paramount in Comorian society- at least on the surface. A few of the key changes 
made to the ruling structure of Comoros were changing the voting age back to 18, set up 
autonomous governorships, and set in place a mechanism by which to secure the power of the 
presidency. The 1978 constitution made sure that the supreme court, national council, and island 
councils were staffed with enough loyalists to maintain control. The president not only selected his 
own Prime Minister but also had a great deal of influence in selecting the Supreme Court and 
National Council.  Functionaries nominated by the president had a disproportionate amount of 
power to the governors and the elected legislative councils on each island. Section II Article 10 
states that those functionaries are embedded into the island’s government to insure “the direction of 
federal services.” (Digitheque-MJP, 2012). 
 The constitution of 1978 is markedly different than Soilihi’s 1977 in that it very clearly 
delineates the powers and topics administered by federal or regional jurisdiction. The federal 
government’s roles were numerous, with each island being predominantly responsible for their own 
budget. Between 40% and 60% of each islands revenue was due to the federal government “It divides 
the remainder among the islands in proportion to the population of each, without any being able to receive less than a 
tenth of this balance.” (Digitheque-MJP, 2012) Obviously with Grande Comore having the largest 
population and being the seat of federal power, this clause was viewed as an overreach by the 
President.  
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 The reign of Abdallah and Denard was fraught with political intrigue both inter and 
intranational. Though it is impossible to know the exact number there were roughly a dozen coup 
attempts against the mercenary regime between 1978 and 1989. Over the years dozens of civil 
service members, military personnel, and even foreign nationals were arrested or killed trying to 
overthrow the president and his guard (Caminade, 2010). But Abdallah’s actual role during his 
tenure as president is up for debate. Abdallah returned to power with the assistance of a French 
trained mercenary and his troops. Within a year of Abdallah’s return Comoros had signed three 
military treaties with France, going so far as to allow a French military base on Comorian soil 
(Caminade 2010). Overtures were made to Arab states as well as the Apartheid regime in South 
Africa, international hotels were built in Moroni and Mitsamihouli (Perri, 1994)  
 Denard’s connection to apartheid South Africa is pointed to by Comorian authors like 
Said Abdillah, Fatouma Halifa, Nakidine Mattoir and others as proof that Denard was actively 
working for the French government. Comoros did not participate in the embargo on South Africa, 
on the contrary the island nation would import Iranian petrol which would then be immediately sold 
to Pretoria (Perri, 1994). South African airlines, lacking refueling stations between Europe and South 
Africa were limited to Malawi and Comoros (Bakar 1988). The severe lack of economic partners led 
South Africa to invest heavily into Comoros to compensate. South Africa’s regional strategies in 
Mozambique and Angola were also hugely controversial and the published literature regarding South 
African clandestine activities will be addressed in the conclusion of this paper. 
 Once it became apparent in the late 1980’s that the end of apartheid was approaching 
Denard himself worried about the financial ramifications to his regime. In an interview with a 
journalist from Figaro, Denard confided that “since last year [South Africa’s] minister of foreign 
affair won’t finance us anymore. Then, the minister of defense began to reduce his contribution. For 
1990, the Comorian budget has had to take over from South Africa.” (Mattoir, 2004).   
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 While Denard claimed simply to be an anti-communist mercenary who decided to settle 
down in Comoros the larger picture is much more sinister. Even though the Constitution of the 
mercenary period reaffirms Comoros’ claim over Mayotte the Comorian government worked closely 
with France militarily and economically. With Denard conducting business and diplomacy with 
political entities off limits to official French diplomats, e.g. those in Tehran or Pretoria, those 
diplomats were a half hour flight away. This arrangement was not to last however. With the 
imminent regime change in South Africa and Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane’s paranoia reaching its 
zenith Denard’s tenure came to abrupt end in 1989.  
 Worried that Denard was going to assassinate him, Ahmed Abdallah had been plotting to 
remove Denard and replace him with a more easily controlled loyalist. Pik Botha, the South African 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, confirmed that President Abdallah had reached out to him in 1987 
seeking to dismiss Denard (Mattoir, 2004). It wasn’t enough to save him, on November 26th 1989 
President Abdallah was shot to death while in a private meeting with Bob Denard (Perri, 1994). 
Although Denard was in the room at the time he claimed not to have fired the shots that killed the 
president, instead Denard claimed that the assassin was former commandant Ahmed Mohammed 
who held a personal grudge against Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane for his dismissal (Mattoir, 2004). 
The accounts given by Denard loyalists varied in regards to the murder weapon and the exact details 
of the assassination. It is the widely held belief in Comoros that if Denard didn’t pull the trigger 
himself but that he gave the order.  
2.5 The Post-Mercenary Regime Power Consolidation and Tension 
  The aftermath of Abdallah’s death was a hectic scramble for the Comorian power 
structure. Denard was extradited to South Africa within days by French paratroopers, eventually 
making his way back to France. Supreme court judge Said Mohammed Djohar, the brother of 
former President Ali Soilihi, took the presidency for himself the day after President Abdallah’s death 
17 
 
(Mattoir, 2004). The early 1990’s realigned global attitudes to South Africa and to communism, 
severely diminishing the interest larger international actors had in the Comorian archipelago.  
 Thus, President Djohar began the process of ruling a Comorian state that had been under 
the despotic rule of President Abdallah and his mercenary cohort. Djohar legalized the formation of 
political parties, reversing Abdallah’s 1982 decree that had established the Union Comorien de Progress 
(Comorian Union for Progress) (UCP) as the sole party (Perri, 1994). Djohar also spearheaded a 
constitutional referendum with the goal of redistributing power from the executive-centric model 
under Abdallah. The constitution was largely the same as under Abdallah with the key distinction of 
establishing a bi-cameral legislature to replace the national council of the previous regime 
(Digitheque-MJP, 2012).  
Regardless of President Djohar’s intentions or the monumental undertaking he attempted, 
his presidency was plagued with unrest and instability. Between his official election in 1990 and the 
Denard-led coup that ousted him in 1995, Said Mohammed Djohar changed parliaments seventeen 
times (Caminade, 2010). In a country accustomed to efficient and often bloody responses to 
attempted coups, Djohar had a comparable number to Abdallah in less than half the time.   
Said Mohamed Djohar was the last Comorian president to be removed from office by Bob 
Denard. On September 28th, 1995, Bob Denard quickly deposed Djohar with a small contingent of 
loyalists and established a temporary military government (Halifa, 2009). However, the international 
community quickly condemned the mercenary and French paratroopers took Denard and his top 
lieutenants into custody by October 5th (Ibid.) Djohar had weathered the coup on nearby Seychelles 
and was reinstated as president late January the following year. Lacking the support and mandate to 
rule, Djohar lost the presidential elections held in March of 1996 to his former Prime Minister Taki 
Abdulkarim. 
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2.6 The 1997 Crisis and the Time of Two Colonels 
Bob Denard’s long and illustrious career in personally leading coups in Comoros came to an 
end in October of 1995. After Djohar’s loss to Mohammed Taki Abdulkarim in 1996, Taki set out 
with a single goal in mind: solidifying his control of the presidency. A high-ranking official under 
both Abdallah and Djohar, Taki had had ample opportunities to learn how to quell dissent. Bob 
Denard and his cohort had deposed and/or killed all his predecessors and Taki was keen not to 
suffer the same fate. On October 20th, 1996 Taki pushed a new constitution through the supreme 
court and legislature. Going further than Djohar or Abdallah ever did on paper, Taki’s constitution 
flagrantly consolidated all available political mechanisms to be under his control.  
 Article 20 of the 1996 document details that the president may, in a state of national 
emergency or interruption of regular government function may, with the approval of the prime 
minister, governors, federal assembly, and national council, be allowed sweeping powers necessary 
to the operation of the state. Article 45 then states that a state of emergency may technically only last 
for more than 15 days except under “exigent circumstances” and refers itself back to article 20. The 
main ethical qualm to this system is then that the President personally appoints four of the ten 
members pf the national council (Article 49) as well as handpicking the island governors (Article 60) 
(Digitheque-MJP, 2012). Taki also incorporated an “Ulema” Council composed of religious leaders 
to advise the government on spiritual matters. In this it seems that Taki was taking the next step 
with Abdallah’s conservative policies to boost his support among the religious community. It also 
marked the first time that such a group was written into a Comorian constitution.  
 Taki’s monopolization of power did not go unnoticed. The wealthy Anjoaunese, who had 
enjoyed their pick of top administrative posts under the Domoni, Anjoun, born President Abdallah, 
began to feel marginalized by Taki’s Ngazidja centric policies. Taki’s supporters rallying cry “Yinu 
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nde yezi ya hatru!” or “our power for us” set the clear goal of using Ngazidja’s larger population and 
land mass to claim the dominance it felt it was owed (Halifa, 2009). Salaries for civil servants on 
Anjoaun and Moheli fell into arrears and a general teacher’s strike was called. Anjoaunese radio 
stations and newspapers began pushing a hardline anti-Ngazidja position.  
 On July 14th, 1997, Anjoaunese political leaders under the leadership of Fundi Abdallah 
Ibrahim, a respected religious leader from Mutsamudu, called for reattachment to France. Despite 
waving the tricolore flag on Bastille Day every French statement reaffirmed Comorian sovereignty and 
condemnation of the separatist movement. The situation became even more complex on August 3rd, 
1997 when Abdallah Ibrahim declared himself president of an independent Anjoaun, unilaterally 
seceding from the union (Halifa, 2009).  The OAU sent Ambassador Pierre Yere as an independent 
observer to Moroni within the week (Said Abdillah, 2011) It quickly became evident that President 
Taki underestimated the resolve of the Anjoaunese separatists. On September 3rd an initial attempt 
to send a small force from Ngazidja into Mutsamudu and restore order led to a violent clash which 
left more than fifty dead in two days (Ibid.)   
 With that bloody clash it quickly became apparent that this crisis was not going to have a 
simple solution. When Mayotte voted to remain with France in the 1970’s the language used focused 
on the French culpability and influence. The Anjoaun crisis in 1997 saw the introduction of the 
word “secession” to the Comorian national dialogue. Violence changed the dynamic and reinforced 
negative stereotypes between the islands. The challenges of this crisis to the group identities of 
Grande Comore and Anjouan will be discussed in detail in section 4.1b. 
 The Arab League, OAU, and international community at large denounced the Anjoaunese 
separatists. Mohammed Ahmad Khandazar, an Arab League mediator, attempted to resolve the 
burgeoning crisis but his efforts fell on deaf ears and an Anjoaunese referendum held on October 
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26th had a 99% vote in favor of independence (Halifa, 2009).  The OAU effected sanctions against 
the Anjoaunese separatists on November 1st and officially condemned them on November 7th (Ibid.) 
The following year would only exacerbate tensions between the islands. The French government, 
hoping to avoid embarrassment, distanced themselves from the crisis. French ambassador to 
Comoros, Gaston le Paudert claimed that France had no interest in annexing Anjoaun “We want to 
maintain the unity of the federation of Comoros” (Caminade, 2010). 
 After the initial attempts by the LAS failed to contain the situation and OAU sanctions did 
not deter the Anjoaunese separatists the internal politics of Comoros took a turn for the worse. 
President Taki accused France of supporting and leading Abdallah Ibrahim’s government. Internal 
divisions began within the separatists, with more militaristic elements beginning to coopt the 
movement. Throughout 1998 the OAU pushed for a diplomatic solution and a joint commission 
with representatives from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
and Kenya facilitated a negotiation with representatives of Taki’s regime and the separatist 
movements from Anjouan and Moheli from March 18 to the 20th (Said Abdillah, 2011).  Although 
the Anjoaunese delegation participated in the talks they rejected the agreement, the Mohelien 
representatives agreed to return to jurisdiction of the Moroni-led government (Caminade, 2010).  
 On November 6th, returning from a state visit to several European and Arab states, Taki 
Abdulkarim allegedly died of a heart attack (Said Abdillah, 2011). Because of issues with transporting 
his body and his piety, Taki was never autopsied. Accusations and rumors of a French assassination 
plot persist to this day. Tajiddine Ben Said Massound, president of the constitutional court, assumed 
the title of interim president the following day. (Ibid.) 
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2.7 The Time of Two Colonels 
 Massound, born in the Anjoaunese city of Domoni, was immediately plagued with 
suspicions that he would be too pro-Anjouan to represent Grande Comore and Moheli. He did little 
to assuage those fears and immediately nominated an overwhelmingly Anjoaunese cabinet (Ibid.) 
Massound never truly convinced his constituents on Moheli and Grande Comore that he was going 
to represent their interests. On April 30th, 1999, Massound was deposed in a coup led by Colonel 
Azali Assoumani who established a military junta to oversee the islands.  
 Before Azali had deposed Massound another round of reconciliation had taken place in 
Antananarivo, Madagascar April 19th to 23rd 1998 (Caminade, 2010). While the Anjoaunese 
delegation again refused to sign the brokered agreement, it built on the previous mediative attempts 
and solidified several key negotiating points. The imbalance of power was acknowledged, and the 
agreement mandated restructuring term limits and representation in an equitable manner. Though 
the 1999 document did not offer any permanent solutions it did choose the name that Comoros 
would adopt at the resolution of the crisis: The Union of Comorian Islands. This name is significant 
considering that the Anjoaunese delegation fervently pushed for several variations of the “United 
States of Comoros” (Said Abdillah, 2011). Overseen by the UN, LAS, and OAU, the talks were an 
instrumental step in setting the framework required to move forward.  
 Colonel Azali wasted no time in cementing his power during the remainder of 1999. 
Nullifying President Taki’s 1996 constitution Azali passed a constitutional charter on May 6th in 
which he claimed immense personal power (Digitheque-MJP, 2012). Condemned by the 
international community at large, Comoros came under sanction by the European Union and United 
States of America.  
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 The OAU appointed Francisco Madeira, a former ambassador from Mozambique, as special 
envoy, replacing his predecessor Ambassador Yere, in August 1999. Madeira attempted to hold 
another round of negotiations in late October but made no headway past what had been agreed in 
Antananarivo earlier that year.  In response to the failed round of talks the separatist government on 
Anjouan held another independence referendum on January 23rd, 2000 (Said Abdillah). Over 60% of 
voters chose independence. However, the vote’s legitimacy was immediately questioned. Fearing 
that the negotiations were not productive the OAU joined the international community in 
sanctioning Anjoaun on February 1st which degraded into an embargo as of March 1st (Caminade 
2010).  
 Bowing to the pressure of the sanctions representatives from Azali’s regime and the 
Anjoaunese separatist’s new leader, Lt. Colonel Abderemane Said Abeid, an agreement was reached 
for reconciliation between the islands. Mediated by Francisco Madeira and OIF special envoy Andre 
Salifou, the General Agreement on National Reconciliation, or Fomboni Accords, on February 21st, 2001. 
The Accords set the timetable for the drafting of a new constitution and holding new elections. A 
tripartite commission consisting of Azali’s regime, Abeid’s representatives, and a collection of civil 
servants from across the islands, each consisting of the same number of representatives ratified the 
Accords (UN Peacemaker, 2001).  
 The Fomboni Accords established several submissions authorized to not only hold 
referendums but also set out to collect weapons and reintegrate potentially radicalized youths. While 
there was a limited amount of direct conflict the multi-year crisis had seen several violent clashes in 
Anjoaun. A constitutional referendum was held on December 23rd, 2001, working within the 
framework of the Fomboni Accords to create what is known as the “Tournante,” or rotating 
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presidency. Roughly 75% of voters approved the 2001 constitution. Col. Azali temporarily stepped 
down as president to win the second round in the election on April 14th, 2002 (Said Abdillah, 2011).  
2.8 The First Two Elections 
 With the establishment of the Tournante the territorial integrity of Comoros had been 
restored. However, the leaders of the two largest islands were Colonel Azali, who gained power in a 
military coup, and newly elected Anjoaunese vice-president Colonel Mohammed Abou Bacar, who 
had taken over from Lt. Colonel Abeid in a coup shortly before the election. With two French trained 
military men at the helm, Comoros gradually normalized relations between the islands. The 
Tournante guaranteed a higher degree of autonomy to each island and the fragile union progressed 
with close supervision of the newly rebranded African Union. On December 20th 2003 the Agreement 
on the Transitional Arrangements in the Comoros or “Beit Salam Agreement,” was a final step in 
solidifying how the Tournante would be carried out. The Beit Salam Agreement created a 
“Harmonization Committee” chaired by representatives of the international community to 
harmonize “customs norms and structures as well as economic data.” (Beit Salam Agreement, 2003) 
Considering how one of Anjouan’s chief accusations against Grande Comore was the unequal 
allocation of resources, the codification of such norms went a long way to solidifying the Tournante.  
 The initial terms of Azali and the island presidents concluded without major incident. The 
AU’s military observer mission and the direct diplomacy of AU chair and former South African 
President Thabo Mbeki tried to smooth the way for free and fair elections in 2006/2007. As set out 
by the Tournante, Azali Assoumani represented Grande Comore for the first round of the 
Tournante. As mandated in the new constitution, the president in the 2006 constitution was to be 
selected from Anjoaun. Under the supervision of the AU Mission for Support to the Elections in 
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the Comoros (AMISEC) roughly 450 military and police personnel and 60 election observers from 
nine countries were deployed to ensure free and fair elections (Svensson, 2009) 
 On May 14th 2006, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi was came to power as arguably the first 
democratically elected President in Comorian history. The following year each island held their 
independent elections to determine the island presidents. Mohammed Abu Bacar was re-elected as 
the president of Anjouan but the constitutional court declared the islands election as invalid on June 
18th 2007, claiming Bacar had stuffed ballot boxes and intimidated voters (Mmadi, 2014).  After 
clashes between government troops and Bacar’s security services resulting in two deaths, the islands 
once again settled into a stalemate (Svensson, 2008). The following year on February 28th, 2008, the 
AU Mission in Comoros deployed around 1,300 hundred military personnel to assist Sambi’s 
government to oust Bacar in “Operation Democracy in Comoros” (Ibid.) The junta quickly fell and 
Bacar himself fled to Mayotte where he was intercepted by French forces and extradited first to 
Reunion and eventually Ghana.  Despite coming under criticism from the Comorian government for 
refusing to turn over Colonel Bacar the French government cited Comoros’ position on capital 
punishment to as a justification. Some have posited that Bacar was a French agent throughout his 
tenure as Anjoaunese president but there is no proof of these allegations. 
 Although Bacar still has a cadre of supporters on Anjouan his ouster in 2008 has marked a 
turning point in Comorian politics. Sambi relinquished power at the end of his term to Mohelien 
candidate Ikililou Dhoinine, completing a full cycle of the Tournante. Azali Assoumani was reelected 
in May of 2016. All of these elections, as well as the staggered elections for island presidents, have 
been deemed (for the most part) free and fair by international observers and CENI officials. As 
discussed in the Inquiry Findings section below, the Tournante has been effective in reunifying the 
country and establishing a precedent for transitions of power. However, as remarked upon by 
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several interview candidates the current system has some potential drawbacks in the middle and 
long-term.  
One interesting note regarding Sambi’s election and eventual victory over Col. Bacar is the 
notable class divide between the two men. Mohammed Bacar was born in Barakani, a medium sized 
agricultural village in the north of Anjouan. Throughout Bacar’s career in the Comorian gendarmerie 
he became police chief and eventually used that power to take control of the entire island. Contrast 
that to the political career of Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, born as a scion of a rich and influential family 
of preachers in the heart of Anjoaun’s capital city Mutsamudu, Sambi was a born and bred kabaila. 
Sambi’s biography attempts to distance him from the trappings of wealth and influence he was born 
with and instead focuses on his extensive studies in religion and starting his own political party 
(Mmadi, 2014).  However, Fatouma Nassour’s research on the rift between the two men points to a 
degree of class resentment as a part of the rift between the men. The same can be said of Azali 
Assoumani’s relationship with Sambi and other elements of the higher classes in Comoros. Azali is 
famous for being one of the only major political players in Comorian politics past or present not to 
have had a Grande Marriage ceremony. The class divides are rooted in the sultanate period of 
Comorian history and cannot be explored further, yet remain fascinating in their manifestations. 
Section 3: Inquiry Design and Findings 
3.1 Structure of the Literature Review 
The literature review of this paper set out to collect Comorian voices on the struggles 
surrounding the decolonization process. Although there exists a limited amount of available 
information on the Comorian independence referendums and subsequent challenges the author has 
collected as many diverse relevant narratives as possible. However, there is a distinct lack of 
information from Comorian voices available in English. The published Francophone literature has 
been paired with UN reports, AU reports, scholarly articles, and newspaper articles to establish a 
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context and timeline for the analysis of the collected data. Works on group identity theory and 
conflict resolution were also utilized to provide additional lens by which to view the subject material. 
The literature is also instrumental in allowing for Comorian voices and opinions on topics that were 
not possible to conduct surveys on for both security concerns and the unavailability of suitably aged 
participants. The full text of the survey question are attached in section 6.1 Appendix A. 
 In analyzing the collected data, the author will present the information in two sections. 
Questions from section one are formatted on the Likert scale and the aggregate information will be 
divided into several demographic groups. Through this division differences in public opinion can be 
quantitatively reviewed based on age, gender, location, and education. Section two of the survey 
form is predominantly qualitative and seeks more personalized responses to questions specifically 
concerning methods of receiving information as well as opinions regarding tensions between the 
islands. Data from section two will be reviewed by the researcher and divided into groups based on 
the similarity of responses. With participant approval the researcher will translate and use relevant 
quotations to supplement written sources.  
3.2 Quantitative Surveys 
Quantitative Survey Framework 
Projected number of participants: 40 
Locations:   
• Grande Comore: 20 total, 10 male/10 
female, 10 urban/10 rural (ex. 5 rural 
males/ 5 urban males) Age and 
education information will be averaged 
• Anjoaun: 20 total, 10 male/10 female, 
10 urban/10 rural (ex. 5 rural males/ 5 
urban males) Age and education 
information will be averaged 
 
 
 Final number of participants: 40  
Locations: 
• Grande Comore: 20 participants  
o 12 Men/8 Women 
o 12 Rural/8 Urban 
o Average age: 32.5 
o Average Male age: 32 
o Average female age: 33 
o Age range: 22-73 
• Anjoaun: 20 participants 
o 9 Men/11 Women 
o 10 Rural/10 Urban 
o Average age: 40.6 
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o Average Male age: 42.5 
o Average Female age: 38.9 
o Age range: 24-49 
 
3.3 Limitations 
 The researcher acknowledges several key limitations to the efficacy of the study. Translation 
issues, security concerns, transportation, and most importantly the small scope possible in this study 
have limited what has been possible for the author to address. This project was self-funded by the 
author and travel expenses to the island of Moheli proved too high to conduct firsthand work. 
However, because the project focused mainly on the tensions between Grande Comore and 
Anjoaun the author believes that the lack of Mohelien voices does not compromise the validity of 
the work. That lack does however deprive the work of insights from a portion of Comorian society 
and cannot be ignored.  
The scope of the project and selection of participants presented difficulties on several fronts. 
Participants were selected on several criteria: French fluency was not required but basic literacy was 
for the consent form, participants were to be at least 18 years old, participants had to agree to the 
confidentiality waiver. While the author approached a number of Comorians who matched the 
demographic criteria as set out in the proposal a number of Comorians were suggested by Peace 
Corps volunteers and other community members based on their lived experience through many of 
the events described. These volunteers and suggested candidates were then assessed for suitability 
based on the initial lack of rural and female candidates.  
Firstly, many of the participants in the surveys viewed the questions as a sort of exam and 
several interested candidates refused to fill out the forms, not for any security concern but rather 
that they were embarrassed to take an exam they were worried about failing. Because of the authors 
role in the community as an educator many participants often had difficulty separating him from 
28 
 
that role and his role as a researcher. There was also the persistent issue on the island of Grande 
Comore, especially in rural communities, where candidates would accuse the author of being a 
French or American spy and refuse to speak to him. The author had predicted that this might be an 
issue and in his proposal for candidate selection decided to reach out through Peace Corps 
volunteers already in those communities.  
Relying on other Peace Corps volunteers to help find interested candidates in Grande 
Comores presented several difficulties. First, roughly half of the interviewees requested that the 
volunteer from their community remain present throughout the interview. Second, this resulted in a 
potentially disproportionate number of more highly educated Comorian participants with 40% of 
Anjoaunese and 35% of Grande Comorien interviewees having university degrees.  Another Grande 
Comore specific issue was the linguistic difference between the dialects between Grande Comore 
and Anjoaun. As stated in his proposal the author simply used French, however it did negatively 
affect the author’s ability to interview elderly candidates on that island.  
Regarding the challenges presented by transportation the author was unfortunate in that one 
of the two operating airlines between the islands shut down and made travel costs and schedules 
prohibitively expensive. The rainy season of 2017 also compromised the authors ability to move 
around the island of Anjoaun due to the severity of the damage to the island’s main road. Comoros 
also suffers from longstanding issues with reliable electricity and internet/cellular connections which 
provided a series of challenges to arranging suitable times to meet with and contact interested 
candidates.  
3.4 Researcher Subjectivity 
The author acknowledges his biases and unique position in his community as both a Peace 
Corps volunteer and a researcher. Throughout his service the author tried his utmost to integrate 
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into his community through language, cultural events, and community engagement. However, this 
does not change the fact that he is a white American man who was hosted for two years by a 
Comorian family and community. His role as an educator, both in his English clubs and his work at 
the secondary school, affected how he was viewed in his community and the connections he could 
establish in his own community and across the country.   
As a member of the first Peace Corps cohort in Comoros the author had to not only explain 
what the mission of Peace Corps was he then had to explain his justifications for collecting data on 
the Comorian political system and history. As mentioned earlier, the author dealt with many skeptics 
and accusations of being involved in an intelligence agency. While the author was able to mitigate 
many of these suspicions based on his integration and personal connections on Anjoaun there was a 
higher level of scrutiny and skepticism on his work on Grande Comore. Furthermore, the author 
must acknowledge his own personal bias towards Grande Comore after so long on Anjouan. In 
discussions with colleagues on Grande Comore the author realized that he had framed several of the 
questions regarding the 1997 crisis in a more pro-Anjouan light than he had intended. He does not 
believe this has negatively impacted the quality of responses to those questions and received no 
comments from interviewees that those questions were unfairly worded.  
3.5 Inquiry Findings 
 The survey questions were designed to obtain information mostly about the differences in 
subgroups opinions regarding the other islands, Comorian government, and France. The survey 
contains 12 total questions, three Likert scale responses, three yes/no questions, and 6 written 
response questions. These questions were designed in consultation with Peace Corps staff, the 
authors Comorian colleagues, and his Capstone advisor to a mix of qualitative and quantitative data. 
Although the author included one question about post-2001 topics (Question 2 Section 1 “How do 
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you feel about France’s actions in Comoros post-2001?) The author took care not to include any 
questions regarding controversial topical events.  One of the main goals of the research was to see 
what the differences in how people learned of the events of 1997 and the emotions behind those 
responses. The author had initially planned to include more detailed questions regarding the 2008 
African Union military intervention, however that proved potentially risky for the author and 
candidates and that topic was relegated to the literature review.  
The full results from the surveys can be found in appendix one, however certain statistics 
and quotations relevant to the findings will be offered in this section to contextualize some of the 
differences and similarities between the two surveyed groups. Demographically the groups from 
Grande Comore and Anjoaun varied in several ways. The average age of Anjoaunese participants 
(40.6) is almost a decade older than Grande Comore’s (32.5.) The surveyed populations had similar 
levels of education with 40% of Anjoaunese candidates and 35% of Grande Comoriens holding 
university degrees. Both groups had 35% who had not completed Middle School level, however the 
Anjoaunese group had one participant who had not studied after primary school and another who 
reported no structured education whatsoever.   
 The cumulative response to the Likert Scale questions of Section One were generally the 
same across both groups. Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of the Anjoaunese group reported 
having been to France or Mayotte with 45% of the Anjouan group responding “yes.” Interestingly 
the rural and urban subgroups on Anjouan responded nearly identically with 40% and 50% 
respectively reporting yes. This is starkly different to the numbers on Grande Comore where only 
10% of rural participants reported visiting French territory contrasted to 62% of the urban 
population. The author does not believe that the response of those urban subjects is representative 
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of the larger urban population outside of the wealthier upper-class that were the majority urban 
research participants. 
 Questions asking about the average sentiment to France on the 1-10 Likert Scale model 
received predominantly low responses with an occasional higher outlying response. For example, the 
first question in section 1 “How do you feel about France's actions in Comoros from 1975-2000?” 
had an average response of 3.55 on Anjoaun but 30% of participants indicated scores of 5 or higher. 
Most participants on both Anjoaun and Grande Comore selected responses to section one that were 
between 1 and 4 on the Likert Scale.  
 Of the forty participants interviewed the author was only able to work with two elderly 
women who had voted in the original independence referendum. Considering the ways in which the 
French and Comorien authors approached this topic it was valuable to be able to include their 
voices. The author had been hopeful of attracting more elderly participants to the project, but this 
demographic group was especially reluctant to sign the confidentiality agreement.  
 The author was unsurprised to see that question four in section 2 (How did you hear about 
the 1997 secession crisis of Anjoaun and Moheli?) received drastically different responses between 
the islands. While only 20% of Anjoaunese reported unfamiliarity with the 1997 crisis, 45% of 
Grande Comoriens had no idea that anything of import had happened. More than half of 
Anjouanese participants (60%) indicated on question 6 that they believed the secession attempt was 
justified as opposed to 15% of Grande Comore’s group. It must be noted that 20% of the Anjouan 
group was unfamiliar or chose not to respond to question five while 40% of the Grande Comore 
group were unfamiliar and 45% voted no.  
 It is unsurprising that the majority of responses to question five section one were negative 
given the overall low scores on the Likert Scale question gaging general opinions on Franco-
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Comorian relations. Consistent across both islands and separate demographic groups the many 
responses showcased some very strong emotions and claims.   
The following excerpts are solely from participants who gave explicit verbal and written consent for 
their submissions to be included in the final study and associated with their names.  
Massondi Chamussidine, an Anjoaunese university student, felt that there was a bad relationship 
between the French and Comorian governments because “the French government treated Comorians as 
slaves.” 
Patrice Keldi, an Anjoaunese chauffeur, feels that Comorian instability is attributable to France 
Since it seized the independence of Comoros, France has pursued us with coup d’etats without 
end. For Mahorais people who wanted independence but were not allowed to because of the 
French military which is also surrounding our borders. All of the coups were able to progress 
unchallenged because they were led by the French and the French citizen Bob Denard.  
Allaoui Said Tourqui, a Peace Corps employee from Moroni, decried French interference as well 
“France is such a hypocrite country and the Comorian government knows it. Wherever we have political instability 
France is always behind it.” 
 Despite reaching out to several elderly Comorians old enough to have voted in the original 
independence referendum only two participants accepted and gave the requisite permissions on the 
confidentiality form.  These women came form the same city as Ahmed Abdallah, the first president 
following that vote. Both reported that they were forced to vote for independence under threat of 
violence from the government. Interviews with both women were conducted in a mix of Shindzwani 
and French at the participants request. However, when pressed for more details on the ways in 
which they were pressured to vote and what they remembered of the immediate aftermath of the 
vote neither woman offered much elaboration.  
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 In regards to the disparity of knowledge surrounding the events of 1997 between the 
surveyed groups from Anjouan and Grande Comore the author has selected certain quotations from 
participants who authorized the inclusion.  
Mohammed Moutui, a professor from Mutsamudu (capital city of Anjoaun), responding to how he 
heard about the events in 1997 responded 
I participated in the radio and tv debates on TV Uhuru Anjoaun. I lived through the 
demonstrations and the rumors of the strike and everyone who signed the separatists petition. I 
participated in the protest that saw two men killed by Commander Mataba. 
Daroussi Abdallah, a school administrator in the rural southern Anjoaunese town of Moya, reported 
that he found out about the situation through a family tragedy.  
I have an uncle who was assassinated during the crisis. I was in school and my school master was 
told over the phone and came in and told me/us what happened.  
As compared to those from Anjouan, the Grande Comorien responses were far less personal. Most 
participants reported either unfamiliarity with the subject or learning about it in school.  
Anturia Mihidaji, a nurse working in Moroni, responded that  
I was young but I lived through the crisis. The crisis was however involving the island of 
Anjouan only and what I lived here in Grande Comore was seeing people from Anjoaun being 
chased out of their homes in Moroni by Ngazidja people.  
The above response was unusual in several ways. As mentioned earlier, 45% of the Grande Comore 
group reported either having forgotten or being unfamiliar with the 1997 crisis in general. On 
Anjoaun only 20% reported unfamiliarity and those participants were elderly women who freely 
admitted that they didn’t pay attention to politics. Even those Anjoaunese who did not know about 
the new constitution (see below) had some sort of personal connection or general knowledge about 
the crisis.  
 When asked about the efficacy of the new constitution and the establishment of the 
Tournante the results on Grande Comore were split with 40% believing that the 2001 Constitution 
was an equitable, if temporary, solution and 10% believed it wasn’t. There were just as many people 
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surveyed on Grande Comore that weren’t aware of the new constitution’s existence as supported it. 
On Anjouan the results were divided into thirds without a single sentiment taking precedence. 
However, on both Anjouan and Grande Comore there was a clear divide between the urban and 
rural populations with roughly 50% of surveyed urban participants on both islands choosing “yes.” 
Retired Anjoaunese businessman Hamid Abasse remarked “at that period it was actually very good 
but the situation has evolved so it [the Tournante] must change.” It must be noted that while 
numerous interviewees called for the adjustment of the Tournante, none offered any potential 
changes to it.  
 The last question on the survey, “do you believe there is conflict between the Comorian 
islands,” yielded some fascinating discrepancies of opinion. An overwhelming 85% of Anjoaunese 
participants believe there is conflict or tension, more than double the 40% of surveyed participants 
from Grande Comore who believe the same. Responses from Grande Comore were also less likely 
to paint a single side as an aggressor or solely at fault and instead focused on France or the structure 
of the Tournante itself. Salim Chanfi, a student at the university of Comoros, responded 
In my opinion I think we must first move away from France on an economic level and secondly 
eliminate the Tournante and vote between islands for each candidate based on his strength and 
not his island.   
Halima Miradji, an English language instructor in Moroni, likened the situation to a family “just like 
brothers and sisters, people argue and have its opinions” however she continued on to say “Though I don’t 
think there is conflict between the islands.” 
 These responses are in stark contrast to those elicited from Anjoaunese participants. One 
rural Anjoaunese participant who identified herself simply as Charfia responded as follows 
There has never been stability because of problems with employment. These render us permanently 
unhappy [Anjouan and Moheli] Also our language [Shindzwani] is insulted across the islands as they 
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are separated. The Grande Comoriens violated the women of Anjouan in Moroni’s port and that insult 
stays in our hearts. There will always be issues between us. 
Arlette Kaembi, a shop owner in the southern Anjoaunese town Mremani simply wrote “the Grande 
Comoriens must consider us [Anjoaunese] as Comorians too. They always treat us as lesser.”  
Daroussi Abdallah, an Anjoaunese school administrator, blamed the structure of the Tournante 
itself  
There is always conflict because of political intrigues. Written into the Tournante is a course that 
pushes those in power to benefit their own island at the expense of the others. This is what 
makes the Tournante so fragile. Basically, the Tournante exists to give the chance to each island 
governor to alleviate some of the hate between Comorians.  
These quotations have been drawn solely from the written responses to the questions in Appendix 
A, and many of those responses would have been significantly longer had the author allotted more 
space to write. Almost every survey also resulted in a longer one on one talk with the participants 
where they expanded on their opinions. The level of negativity against France was unsurprising, 
however the author was surprised at the disparity of the responses between islands regarding the 
other islands. It seemed that to participants from Grande Comore the events on Anjouan were so 
distant they may as well have been in a different country. This is in stark contrast to the Anjoaunese 
responses which brought about strong emotions and several times noticeable anger.  
Section 4: Through the Lens of Vamik Volkan and Johan Galtung 
4.1 The Division of Comorian Group Identity 
 Geographically, culturally, and linguistically, all four islands in the Comorian archipelago 
share a high degree of homogeneity. In the author’s lived experience on the islands he heard 
countless times that the island dialects are mutually intelligible and that the Chaifite Islam binds 
Comoros together. Even Shimaore, the native dialect of Mayotte, is easily understood by advanced 
speakers of the other dialects. But in the forty years since Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli left 
France, the three islands have held a lingering resentment about Mayotte. However there exists a 
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historical power disequilibrium between the larger islands, Grande Comore and Anjouan, and the 
smaller of the four, Moheli and Mayotte.  
 Colonized by France over the second half of the 18th century, Mayotte was the first to come 
under the French flag in 1841. Although all four islands were ruled as an extension of the prefecture 
of Madagascar, Comoros was granted semi-autonomous rule after the Second World War. 
Dzaoudzi, Mayotte’s capital, was chosen as the seat of the Comorian presidency and legislature. 
However, in 1960, the capital was shifted to Moroni (Halifa, 2009). This perhaps is the single most 
significant event in pinpointing when and where public sentiment on Mayotte pulled away from the 
Comorian identity and sought protection in the French identity. Mayotte’s historical fears of 
subjugation by Grande Comore were realized in the power grab by the Moroni wakabaila. In his 
work Blind Trust, Vamik Volkan posits that large-group identity as it incorporates ethnic, religious, or 
national identities is irrevocably linked to a “core” identity which include the totality of an 
individuals lived experiences (Volkan, 2004). Volkan goes on to say that most of the time “we are 
not even aware of this link until our large-group identity is threatened…” (Volkan, 2004).  
 In stereotypes and prejudices that date back to the pre-colonial Comorian sultanates there 
exists a divide between those of Arab descent and those of Bantu origin. The Wakabaila claim 
Middle Eastern heritage and those noble houses have dominated Comorian religious and 
bureaucratic posts for generations. The Wamatsaha, predominantly of East African origins are 
farmers and craftsmen. The Wamatsaha are the descendants of slaves and after decades of work 
have begun forming a commercially oriented middle class. But it is the historic domination of 
Wakabaila in the urban centers of Anjoaun and Grande Comore that have maintained dominance 
first through their connections to the Arab world and then through the connection to the French 
metropole beginning after the First World War. Ethnicity, according to Volkan “incorporates 
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religion as well as language; connected with shared images of the groups history, it establishes an 
especially sharp sense of “us” and “them.” (Volkan, 2004). The language surrounding the divisions 
between the islands is one  
 But the manifestation of inter-island prejudices has evolved beyond colonial roots. Each 
island holds negative stereotypes of the others. Anjoaunese are crazy and violent, Grande 
Comoriens are arrogant and lazy, Mohelien are just lazy. And while Grande Comore and Anjouan 
fought for dominance over the archipelago throughout the 1960’s, Mayotte and Moheli were fearful 
of that domination (Halifa, 2009). So, while the present-day Union of Comoros has experienced a 
resurgence of fundamentalist Islam, Mahorais have spent decades moving towards the secularism so 
long embraced by France. Polygamy was outlawed in Mayotte in 2004 while the island was still 
considered a TOM under its own unique set of laws (Bouhet, 2017).  
 The idea of a collective Comorian identity cannot be looked at without acknowledging the 
loss of Mayotte. The trauma to the other three islands has perversely morphed from the initial 
outrage of the 1970’s. Mayotte is seen as a sort of El Dorado and tens of thousands of Comorians, 
especially Anjoaunese, have attempted the perilous voyage for a better life in Mayotte. There exists a 
disconnect between the stated desire to reintegrate Mayotte into the Comorian Union and the desire 
for a higher standard of life. On the Mahorais’ side of the equation there exists a very real fear of 
domination by Comoros. However, that fear has evolved from a fear of suppression by Moroni to a 
fear of being overwhelmed by Anjoaunese immigrants. This fear led nearly half of Mahorais to vote 
for Marine Le Pen in the 2016 French presidential election (Le Monde, 2016). Le Pen visited the 
island early that year, campaigning on promises of a crackdown on illegal immigration.  
 Volkan distinguishes seven threads that compose large group identity: 
1. Shared, tangible reservoirs for images associated with positive emotion 
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2. Shared “good” identifications 
3. Absorption of others “bad” qualities 
4. Absorption of (revolutionary or transforming) leaders’ internal worlds 
5. Chosen glories 
6. Chosen traumas 
7. Formation of symbols that develop their own autonomy (Volkan, 2004) 
Within the framework of these threads one of the most damaging elements of Mayotte’s 
“Frenchness” is the failure to adhere to the mythic past narrative of Comorian Islam. The adoption 
of French secularism and the abandonment of the powerful symbol of Mtsa Mwandze traveling to 
Saudi Arabia and bringing back the holy Qur’an is an insult to Comorian heritage.  
 The geopolitical realities of the Mayotte situation, from Cold War fears to shipping lanes, 
have made the Comorian demand of a four-island state impossible. Since Mayotte’s upgrade to the 
101st département d'outre-mer, Dzaoudzi is just as French as Lyon. But the continued separation will 
continue to exacerbate relations between the other islands simply because of the damage to the 
integrity of the Comorian identity. The islands have been forced to see themselves not as members 
of a single group, but as a single group that has been forcibly divided. And when the unifying bonds 
have been so definitively injured they can be exploited by internal and external forces against 
themselves and each other.  
4.2 The Three R’s Applied to the Fomboni Accords 
 The 1997 secessionist crisis was unusual in not only the goals of the separatists but also the 
conduct of all parties involved. After the initial foray by government forces where fifty soldiers were 
killed in Mutsamudu, there was a distinct absence of direct violence in the form of armed conflict. In 
his work on reconciliation Johan Galtung observes that “it is the failure to transform conflict that 
leads to violence.” (Galtung, 1998). This research has addressed some of the structural violence that 
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Anjouan and Moheli used to justify the secession attempt. But why was there such a lack of direct 
violence considering the length of the crisis and the willingness to use violence? And considering the 
stressors to the process, what successes can be attributed to these processes? 
Of the three “R’s” put forth by Galtung (reconstruction after direct violence, reconciliation 
of conflict parties, and resolution of underlying root conflict) the 1997 Comorian crisis and its 
ramifications up through the 2008 AU intervention to remove Mohammed Bacar, the most relevant 
are the latter two. Because of the lack of direct violence there was effectively no post-conflict 
reconstruction that the parties deemed necessary. The reconciliatory process as led by ambassadors 
Yere and Madeira took the almost six years to finalize the fine details in the Beit Salam agreement. 
With the commitment of the OAU, OIF, LAS, UN, and other international partners the appropriate 
economic pressures were applied to bring the disparate Comorian parties to the table.  
Once Ahmed Abdallah Sambi was elected and the 2008 Anjoaun crisis was resolved via AU 
military intervention it could be argued that a lasting negative peace had been achieved. Galtung 
categorizes peace to generally mean “the capacity to handle conflicts with empathy, nonviolence, 
and creativity” (Galtung, 1998). But it would be difficult to assert that there has ever more than a 
negative peace, absence of direct violence, between Anjouan and Grande Comore.  
“When violence breaks out there are usually two structural causes: too much dominance… or too 
much distance… Combine the two and we get the phenomenon known as (social) exclusion or 
marginalization.” (Ibid.) 
 
The relationship between the Comorian islands since the final days of their colonial period has been 
one of fearing marginalization by the others. Thus, it is only with the acknowledgement of this 
struggle for dominance that progress can be made. The Tournante began to address this issue, and 
in Galtung’s 3R theory the best way to address the perceived inequality is to use a structure-oriented 
perspective:  
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converts the relation from inter-personal, or inter-state/nation, to a relation between two 
positions in a deficient structure. If the parties can agree that the structure was/is deficient and 
that their behavior was an enactment of structural positions rather than anything more personal, 
then turning together against the common problem, the structural violence, should be possible. 
(Ibid.) 
The different stages taken in drafting the Antananarivo Accords, the Fomboni Accords, the 2001 
Constitution, and the Beit Salam Agreement, all focused on finding a way to reintegrate the 
Comorian islands into a single system where it never felt that one was preeminent over the others.  
 In the sixteen years since the establishment of the Tournante a several important shifts must 
be taken into account. While the legitimacy Azali Assoumani’s first election in 2002 may be debated 
the fact that since the election of Ahmed Abdallah Sambi Comoros has transitioned power twice 
without accusations of voter fraud or any direct violence. For a country plagued with instability and 
long stretches of autocracy, the process by which the average Comorian can start to feel that their 
vote matters has begun. The long process of ratifying the newest constitution has offered a potential 
avenue forward to the next chapter in Comorian politics: the conversation has been reoriented so 
that faults are distributed around islands and local leaders rather than solely at France. Even if 
leaders take advantage of the Tournante and constitutional framework to push policies more 
amenable for their native island they are using the legal framework as set out in the Tournante. The 
amount of progress cannot be denied, and as the Tournante begins its second cycle through the 
islands it may become necessary to adjust the framework once again. Despite this, Comoros is finally 
beginning to establish precedents for non-violent solutions and fair elections. And as the islands 
continue to develop and seek economic opportunities that foundation will prove invaluable to 
overcome whatever political hurdles present themselves. 
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Section 5: Conclusions 
5.1 Comoros Moving Forward 
Between the months of August and November the entire island of Anjouan smells of cloves. 
Known as nkarafou, the spices are left to dry on tarps until they are ready to be bagged in old rice 
sacks and sent by bus to an exporter in Mutsamudu. Every evening fishermen are greeted by a 
crowd of children who help them pull their fiberglass boats up the beach for the evening. Those 
same children will then run down the street pulling scuffed red sardine cans they have fixed wheels 
to on a little string. Men of all ages will sit in the local bangwé and play dominos with so much 
enthusiasm they run the risk of shattering the tiles. The mosque will sound the call to prayer and old 
men will stroll with their arms clasped behind their back, animatedly chatting with their companions. 
The islands of the moon. Home to the largest active volcano in the world and a marine park 
that surrounds almost the entire circumference of Moheli. These are islands that have seen 
colonizers and traders from every corner of the world. From Malagasy pirates to Portuguese 
explorers in days past to Chinese engineers and American Peace Corps volunteers. A culture that 
insists on hospitality and generosity. Comoros is an oft-forgotten and little-known nation but it is 
one that is unforgettable.  
But these idyllic islands have tension beneath the surface that will not dissipate any time 
soon. The cultural trauma of losing their sister island of Mayotte and the indignities suffered under 
the mercenary regimes have left the tensions between the islands simmering just under the surface. 
The author vividly remembers tensions running high in early 2017 when Anjouan accused Grande 
Comore of withholding parts from the Saudi donated generators. While even remote villages in 
Grande Comore had twenty-four hour a day electricity, the capital of Anjouan would be lucky to see 
the lights turn on at all on a given day. The author heard many genuinely concerning rumors 
throughout the island about Anjouan’s place within the union.  
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In attempting to provide not only a detailed timeline and context to the 1997 secession crisis 
the author hopes that the limited scope of the in-person surveys conducted has shed some light on 
the attitudes of everyday Comorians. The author believes that the divide between Grande Comorien 
and Anjoaunese surveys responses is indicative of a larger trend in which Anjoaun still holds a 
grudge against Grande Comore while those on Grande Comore do not understand the potential 
reasons for Anjouan’s ire.   
This is not to call into question the strides forward taken in the last sixteen years nor the 
successes in the mediative processes in establishing the Tournante. While the period between 1975 
and 2001 was rife with structural violence and political instability Comoros is currently in a period 
that has seen some marked improvements. With the end of the Cold War and Apartheid the 
interferences of France and South Africa have drastically declined. The Tournante has completed a 
full cycle, and since the ouster of Mohammed Bacar there have been no military coups and the last 
three elections are recognized by the international community as legitimate.  
Since Mayotte became a full-fledged department the likelihood of a four island Comorian state 
is effectively impossible. Despite this, thousands of Comorians attempt the perilous voyage to 
Mayotte seeking economic opportunities.  Accusations of corruption plague every state-run agency 
and civil servant salaries often go months in arrears. Identity politics are more relevant than ever 
with the island of Anjouan seeing a resurgence in conservative Sunni Islam, a consequence of which 
has been the targeting of the small Shia minority. President Azali has been accused of trying to stifle 
opposition parties and neglecting the needs of Anjouan and Moheli.  
So, what can be done moving forward? In the authors opinion the Tournante is the most 
effective solution to inter-island power dynamics. The number one concern needs to be the 
invitation of international investors and offering economic incentives for Comorians to stay within 
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the archipelago rather than move to France or West Africa. Telma, a telecom company based in 
Madagascar, began offering services in Comoros in mid-2016 and began a massively successful 
campaign which lowered rates and increased services. Social services, if they are offered equally, will 
help alleviate interisland tensions. As mentioned above the delay in getting Anjouan’s new 
generators had the potential to escalate dramatically. But once the generators were installed and the 
three islands were once again on a level field the general sentiments became less hostile. The class 
resentment between wakabaila and wamatsaha is unlikely to change anytime soon, but if more civil 
servants are paid on time then the establishment of a middle class can help to offset that. Comoros 
is a victory for mediative diplomacy, and the processes used took time and patience. But it is only 
through taking the time and being patient that progress is made. 
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Section 6: Appendices and References 
6.1 Appendix A: Questions on the Survey Form (Modified) 
Section 1 
1. How do you feel about France's actions in Comoros from 1975-2000? (1 is very negative, 10 
is very positive) Que pensez-vous des actions de la France dans les Comores de 1975 à 2000? 
(1 est très négatif, 10 est très positif) 
1...2...3...4...5...6...7...8...9...10 
 
2. How do you feel about France's actions in Comoros post-2001? (1 is very negative, 10 is 
very positive) Que pensez-vous des actions de la France dans les Comores après 2001? (1 est 
très négatif, 10 est très positif) 
1...2...3...4...5...6...7...8...9...10 
3. Have you ever been to France or Mayotte? Avez-vous déjà été en France où Mayotte? 
[  yes  /  no  ] [  oui  /  non  ] 
4. How do you feel about the relationship between the French government and the Comorian 
government? (1 is very negative, 10 is very positive)                                                                                                                                   
Que pensez-vous de la relation entre le gouvernement français et le gouvernement 
Comorien?    (1 est très négatif, 10 est très positif) 
1...2...3...4...5...6...7...8...9...10 
5. Please provide one or two reasons for how you responded to the previous question.           
Veuillez fournir une ou deux raisons pour lesquelles vous avez répondu à la question 
précédente. 
Section 2 
1. Did you vote in the 1975 referendum on independence from France?                                                     
Avez-vous voté lors du référendum de 1975 sur l'indépendance de la France? 
 [  yes  /  no  ] [  oui  /  non  ]  
2. How did you hear about the results of the referendum?                                                                     
Comment avez-vous entendu parler des résultats du référendum? 
 
3. If you are too young to remember the referendum or were born afterwards, how did you 
learn about it? (For example at school or through a family member) Si vous êtes trop jeune 
pour vous souvenir du référendum ou est né après, comment avez-vous appris à ce sujet? 
(Par exemple à l'école ou par l'intermédiaire d'un membre de la famille) 
 
4. How did you hear about the 1997 secession crisis of Anjoaun and Moheli? Comment avez-
vous entendu parler de la crise de sécession de 1997 de Anjoaun et Moheli? 
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5. Do you think the Anjoaunese and Mohelian separatists were justified in their goals?  Pensez-
vous que les séparatistes Anjoaunais et Mohéliens étaient justifiés dans leurs objectifs? 
 
[  yes  /  no  ] [  oui  / non  ] 
 
6. Do you feel that the 2001 Constitution was a fair and balanced way to resolve the issues 
between the islands? Considérez-vous que la Constitution de 2001 était une manière 
équitable et équilibrée de résoudre les problèmes entre les îles? 
 
7. Do you believe there is conflict or tension between the Comorian Islands? If yes, please 
write what you believe the major issues to be. Croyez-vous qu'il y ait conflit ou tension entre 
les îles Comoriennes? Si oui, écrivez ce que vous croyez les grands problèmes à résoudre. 
 
[  yes  /  no  ] [  oui  / non  ] 
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6.2 Appendix B: Full Text of Confidentiality Agreement 
Consent Form/Formulaire de consentement 
Constitutional Reform: The Decolonization Process in the Comoros Islands 
Nicholas A. Daou, SIT Graduate Institute, Brattleboro, Vermont, United States 
Instructions: 
Please read the following statements carefully and mark your preferences where indicated.  Signing below indicates your 
agreement with all statements and your voluntary participation in the study.  Signing below while failing to mark a 
preference where indicated will be interpreted as a negative preference.  Please ask the researcher if you have any 
questions regarding this consent form. 
Veuillez lire attentivement les énoncés suivants et indiquer vos préférences, le cas échéant. La signature ci-dessous 
indique votre accord avec toutes les déclarations et votre participation volontaire à l'étude. Le fait de signer ci-dessous 
tout en omettant de marquer une préférence lorsque cela est indiqué sera interprété comme une préférence negatif. 
Veuillez demander au chercheur si vous avez des questions concernant ce formulaire de consentement. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
I am aware that this interview is conducted by an independent graduate researcher with the goal of 
analyzing opinions about Comorian history and the Comorian Constitution of 2001. 
Je sais que cette interview est menée par un chercheur diplômé indépendant dans le but d'analyser 
les opinions sur l'histoire comorienne et les constitution Comorien de 2001. 
 
I am aware that the information I provide is for research purposes only. I understand that my 
responses will be confidential and that my name will not be associated with any results of this study 
unless I give my explicit approval to the researcher. 
Je suis conscient que les renseignements que je fournis sont uniquement à des fins de recherche. Je 
comprends que mes réponses seront confidentielles et que mon nom ne sera associé à aucun résultat 
de cette étude à moins que je donne mon approbation explicite au chercheur. 
I am aware that I have the right to refuse to answer any question and to terminate my participation 
at any time, and that the researcher will answer any questions I have about the study. 
Je sais que j'ai le droit de refuser de répondre à toute question et de mettre fin à ma participation à 
tout moment, et que le chercheur répondra à toutes les questions que j'ai sur l'étude. 
 
I am aware of and take full responsibility for any risk, physical, psychological, legal, or social, 
associated with participation in this study. Please feel free to ask the researcher any questions you 
may have on the possible risks associated with this study. 
Je suis conscient et je suis entièrement responsable des risques physiques, psychologiques, juridiques ou 
sociaux liés à la participation à cette étude. N'hésitez pas à demander au chercheur toutes les questions que 
vous pourriez avoir sur les risques éventuels associés à cette étude. 
I am aware that I will not receive monetary compensation for participation in this study, but a copy 
of the final study will be made available to me upon request. (The final project will only be available 
in English) 
47 
 
Je suis conscient que je ne recevrai pas de compensation monétaire pour participer à cette étude, mais une 
copie de l'étude finale sera mise à ma disposition sur demande. (Le projet final ne sera disponible qu'en 
anglais) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
I [   have   /   have not   ] read and understood this document.  
[  J’ai  /  Je n’ai pas  ]  lu et compris ce document. 
I [   do   /   do not   ] give the researcher permission to use my name in the final study. 
Je [  donner   /   ne pas donner  ] au chercheur la permission d'utiliser mon nom dans l'étude finale. 
I [  do  /  do not  ] give the researcher permission to use my age, gender, location, occupation, and 
educational information in the final study.  
Je [  donner   /   ne pas donner  ] au chercheur la permission d'utiliser mon âge, sexe, location, 
occupation, et information éducatif dans l'étude finale. 
Date/Dat :__________________                      Participant’s Signature: 
                                                         Signature de Participant: 
 
                                                                              
                              Participant’s Printed Name: 
                                                                                         Nom Imprimé du Participant : 
                                          
                                                 
                                     Researcher’s Signature: 
                                                                                Signature de Chercheur : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
Thank you for participating! 
Merci pour votre participation! 
Questions, comments, concerns, 
and requests for the final written 
study can be directed to: 
Les questions, les commentaires, 
les plaintes et les demandes 
d'étude écrite finale peuvent être 
adressées à: 
Nicholas Daou 
Telephone 360-01-37 
Email: nicholas.daou@mail.sit.edu  
pcvnadcomoros@gmail.com 
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6.3 Appendix C: Aggregate Information Collected Through Surveys 
Grande Comore 
Permission 1 Granted: 100%  
Permission 2 Granted: 65% 
Permission 3 Granted: 90% 
Education Levels: 
University: 35% (7 Participants) Some Primary School: 0% 
BAC (High School Completed) 15% (3 Participants) None: 0% 
Some High School: 15% (3 Participants) N/A: 15% (3 Participants) 
Some Middle School: 20% (4 Participants)  
 
Section 1 
 Question 1 [How do you feel about France’s actions in Comoros 75-01 (Likert Scale)] 
Average: 3.25 Rural: 2.8 
Men:  3.5 Urban: 3.9 
Women: 2.8  
 
 Question 2 [How do you feel about France’s actions in Comoros post-2001 (Likert Scale)] 
Total: 3.2 Rural: 2.6 
Men: 3.25 Urban: 3.9 
Women: 3  
 
 Question 3 (positive responses only) [Have you ever been to Mayotte/France] 
Total: 35% Rural: 10% 
Men: 50% Urban: 62% 
Women: 12% N/A: 5% 
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Question 4 [How do you feel about the relationship between the French and Comorian governments?] 
Total: 3.5 Rural: 2.25 
Men: 3.6 Urban: 5 
Women: 2.8  
 
Section 2 
 Question 1 [Did you vote in the 1975 Independence Referendum?] 
Total: 0% Urban: 0% 
Men: 0% Rural: 0% 
Women: 0%  
 
 Question 2 [(If yes to question 1) How did you hear about results?] 
Government: 0% N/A: 100% 
 
 Question 3 [(If no to question 1) How did you hear about results?] 
Family: 35% School: 40% 
Radio: 5% Community: 10% 
Participated: 0% N/A: 0% 
Unfamiliar: 10%  
 
 Question 4 [How did you hear about 1997 Crisis?] 
Family: 15% School: 0% 
Radio: 15% Community: 15% 
Participated: 0% N/A: 10% 
Unfamiliar: 45%  
 Question 5 [Do you think the actions of separatists were justified?] 
Yes total: 15% No Total: 45% 
Yes Urban: 12.5% No Urban: 62.5% 
Yes Rural: 16.6% No Rural: 41.6% 
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Unfamiliar: 40% N/A: 0% 
 Question 6 [Do you think 2001 Constitution is a fair way to resolve issues between islands?] 
Yes Total: 40%   No Total: 10% Temporary Yes: 15% 
Yes Urban: 50%  No Urban: 12.5% Unfamiliar: 25% 
Yes Rural: 16.6%  No Rural: 8% N/A: 5% 
Forgot: 15% 
[Temporary yes averaged in with total yes] 
 Question 7 [Do you believe there is conflict between islands?] 
Yes Total: 40% No Total: 60% 
Yes Urban: 25% No Urban: 75% 
Yes Rural: 50% No Rural: 50% 
Yes Male: 33% No Male: 66% 
Yes Female: 50% No Female: 50% 
 
Anjoaun  
Permission 1 Granted: 100%  
Permission 2 Granted: 95% 
Permission 3 Granted: 95% 
Education Levels: 
University: 40% (8 Participants) Some Primary School: 5% (1 Participant) 
BAC (High School Completed) 20% (4 Participants) None: 5% (1 Participant) 
Some High School: 10% (2 Participants) N/A: 5% (Participant) 
Some Middle School: 15% (3 Participants)  
 
Section 1 
 Question 1 [How do you feel about France’s actions in Comoros 75-01 (Likert Scale)] 
Average: 3.2 Rural: 2.8 
Men:  4 Urban: 3 
Women: 2.5  
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 Question 2 [How do you feel about France’s actions in Comoros post-2001 (Likert Scale)] 
Total: 5.8 Rural: 3.1 
Men: 3.5 Urban: 2.2 
Women: 1.9  
 
Question 3 (positive responses only) [Have you ever been to Mayotte/France] 
Total: 45% Rural: 40% 
Men: 66% Urban: 50% 
Women: 27%  
 
Question 4 [How do you feel about the relationship between the French and Comorian governments?] 
Total: 3.4 Rural: 4.1 
Men: 4.8 Urban: 2.3 
Women: 2.2  
 
Section 2 
 Question 1 [Did you vote in the 1975 Independence Referendum?] 
Total: 10%  Urban: 20% 
Men: 0% Rural: 0% 
Women: 18%  
  
Question 2 [(If yes to question 1) How did you hear about results?] 
Government: 10% N/A: 90% 
  
Question 3 [(If no to question 1) How did you hear about results?] 
Family: 30% School: 40% 
Radio: 5% Community: 5% 
Participated: 10% N/A: 20% 
Unfamiliar: 0%  
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Question 4 [How did you hear about 1997 Crisis?] 
Family: 25% School: 10% 
Radio: 0% Community: 20% 
Participated: 20% N/A: 5% 
Unfamiliar: 20%  
  
Question 5 [Do you think the actions of separatists were justified?] 
Yes total: 60% No Total: 20% 
Yes Urban: 60% No Urban: 5% 
Yes Rural: 60% No Rural: 10% 
Unfamiliar: 15% N/A: 5% 
  
Question 6 [Do you think 2001 Constitution is a fair way to resolve issues between islands?] 
Yes Total: 35% No Total: 30% Temporary Yes: 10% 
Yes Urban: 50% No Urban: 5% Unfamiliar: 30% 
Yes Rural: 10% No Rural: 25% N/A: 5% 
[Temporary yes averaged in with total yes] 
 Question 7 [Do you believe there is conflict between islands?] 
Yes Total: 85% No Total: 10% 
Yes Urban: 80% No Urban: 20% 
Yes Rural: 95% No Rural: 0% 
N/A: 5%  
 
Notes:  
• Question 6 Section 2 averages temporary yes with total yes because of prevalence of the response 
• The author only found two participants who had voted in the initial referendum in 1974 willing to declare their 
age 
• Several participants who declined to give full permissions agreed to provide some general info while 
withholding name and location 
• Urban and Rural results are averaged from within that subsection rather than the total sample population from 
the island group 
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